

Congress of the United States

Washington, DC 20515

April 6, 2011

The Honorable Timothy Geithner
Secretary
The Department of Treasury
1500 Pennsylvania Ave, NW
Washington, DC 20220

The Honorable Ben Bernanke
Chairman
The Federal Reserve Board
20th Street and Constitution
Avenue, NW
Washington, DC 20429

The Honorable Gary Gensler
Chairman
U.S. Commodity Futures Trading
Commission
Three Lafayette Centre
1155 21st Street, NW
Washington, DC 20581

The Honorable Mary Schapiro
Chairman
U.S. Securities and Exchange
Commission
100 F Street, NE
Washington, DC 20549

Dear Chairmen Gensler, Schapiro, Bernanke and Secretary Geithner:

We appreciate the work you and your staffs have undertaken in drafting rules to implement Title VII of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (P.L. 111-203) (“the Act”). While we have been encouraged by many of your comments regarding capital and margin requirements, we write to reiterate the critical importance of establishing a regulatory regime that will not create economic disincentives for end-users to access the derivatives markets.

We write as the Chairmen of the principal Congressional committees overseeing the implementation of the Act, to restate our continued support for the comments expressed in the June 30, 2010 letter from former Senators Christopher Dodd and Blanche Lincoln (see attached). Specifically, regulators should exempt end-users from margin requirements and seek to limit other regulatory burdens that could have the unintended effect of driving up costs for end users and increasing systemic risk for our economy.

Efficient access to derivatives enables companies to increase certainty in their businesses, and consumers benefit from companies’ prudent risk management activities through lower volatility in the prices of day-to-day goods and services, such as food, electricity and transportation. If end-user transactions are subject to margin requirements, costs for consumers could

increase, and end-users may divert working capital from activities that promote economic growth and job creation.

It is also essential that you continue to coordinate with each other as you write rules to implement Title VII, especially on rules that will impact end-user costs. Interagency coordination consistent with the spirit and provisions of the Act is critical to create a streamlined regulatory framework that reduces unnecessary expenses, maximizes certainty for companies and minimizes regulatory arbitrage.


Additionally, as required by the Act, our new derivatives rules must be closely coordinated with international efforts to regulate derivatives. Undoubtedly, foreign markets are closely watching how U.S. regulators are implementing Title VII, including the protections for end-user companies. As American businesses seek to compete around the globe, our markets must not be put at a competitive disadvantage.

Title VII of the Act was designed to establish a robust new regulatory regime for derivatives, while maintaining highly-liquid and well-functioning markets that will fuel economic growth and job creation. As your agencies progress in the rulemaking process, we urge you to craft rules that carefully strike this important balance.


Sincerely,




Senator Debbie Stabenow
Chairman
Senate Committee on Agriculture,
Nutrition and Forestry



Senator Tim Johnson
Chairman
Senate Committee on Banking,
Housing, and Urban Affairs



Representative Frank D. Lucas
Chairman
House Committee on Agriculture



Representative Spencer Bachus
Chairman
House Committee on
Financial Services

Enclosure

United States Senate

WASHINGTON, DC 20510

June 30, 2010

The Honorable Chairman Barney Frank
Financial Services Committee
United States House of Representatives
2129 Rayburn House Office Building
Washington, DC 20515

The Honorable Chairman Colin Peterson
Committee on Agriculture
United States House of Representatives
1301 Longworth House Office Building
Washington, DC 20515

Dear Chairmen Frank and Peterson:

Whether swaps are used by an airline hedging its fuel costs or a global manufacturing company hedging interest rate risk, derivatives are an important tool businesses use to manage costs and market volatility. This legislation will preserve that tool. Regulators, namely the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC), the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), and the prudential regulators, must not make hedging so costly it becomes prohibitively expensive for end users to manage their risk. This letter seeks to provide some additional background on legislative intent on some, but not all, of the various sections of Title VII of H.R. 4173, the Dodd-Frank Act.

The legislation does not authorize the regulators to impose margin on end users, those exempt entities that use swaps to hedge or mitigate commercial risk. If regulators raise the costs of end user transactions, they may create more risk. It is imperative that the regulators do not unnecessarily divert working capital from our economy into margin accounts, in a way that would discourage hedging by end users or impair economic growth.

Again, Congress clearly stated in this bill that the margin and capital requirements are not to be imposed on end users, nor can the regulators require clearing for end user trades. Regulators are charged with establishing rules for the capital requirements, as well as the margin requirements for all uncleared trades, but rules may not be set in a way that requires the imposition of margin requirements on the end user side of a lawful transaction. In cases where a Swap Dealer enters into an uncleared swap with an end user, margin on the dealer side of the transaction should reflect the counterparty risk of the transaction. Congress strongly encourages regulators to

establish margin requirements for such swaps or security-based swaps in a manner that is consistent with the Congressional intent to protect end users from burdensome costs.

In harmonizing the different approaches taken by the House and Senate in their respective derivatives titles, a number of provisions were deleted by the Conference Committee to avoid redundancy and to streamline the regulatory framework. However, a consistent Congressional directive throughout all drafts of this legislation, and in Congressional debate, has been to protect end users from burdensome costs associated with margin requirements and mandatory clearing. Accordingly, changes made in Conference to the section of the bill regulating capital and margin requirements for Swap Dealers and Major Swap Participants should not be construed as changing this important Congressional interest in protecting end users. In fact, the House offer amending the capital and margin provisions of Sections 731 and 764 expressly stated that the strike to the base text was made “to eliminate redundancy.” Capital and margin standards should be set to mitigate risk in our financial system, not punish those who are trying to hedge their own commercial risk.

Congress recognized that the individualized credit arrangements worked out between counterparties in a bilateral transaction can be important components of business risk management. That is why Congress specifically mandates that regulators permit the use of non-cash collateral for counterparty arrangements with Swap Dealers and Major Swap Participants to permit flexibility. Mitigating risk is one of the most important reasons for passing this legislation.

Congress determined that clearing is at the heart of reform – bringing transactions and counterparties into a robust, conservative and transparent risk management framework. Congress also acknowledged that clearing may not be suitable for every transaction or every counterparty. End users who hedge their risks may find it challenging to use a standard derivative contracts to exactly match up their risks with counterparties willing to purchase their specific exposures. Standardized derivative contracts may not be suitable for every transaction. Congress recognized that imposing the clearing and exchange trading requirement on commercial end-users could raise transaction costs where there is a substantial public interest in keeping such costs low (i.e., to provide consumers with stable, low prices, promote investment, and create jobs.)

Congress recognized this concern and created a robust end user clearing exemption for those entities that are using the swaps market to hedge or mitigate commercial risk. These entities could be anything ranging from car companies to airlines or energy companies who produce and distribute power to farm machinery manufacturers. They also include captive finance affiliates, finance arms that are hedging in support of manufacturing or other commercial companies. The end user exemption also may apply to our smaller financial entities - credit unions, community banks, and farm credit institutions. These entities did not get us into this crisis and should not be punished for Wall Street’s excesses. They help to finance jobs and provide lending for communities all across this nation. That is why Congress provided regulators the authority to exempt these institutions.

This is also why we narrowed the scope of the Swap Dealer and Major Swap Participant definitions. We should not inadvertently pull in entities that are appropriately managing their risk. In implementing the Swap Dealer and Major Swap Participant provisions, Congress expects the regulators to maintain through rulemaking that the definition of Major Swap Participant does not capture companies simply because they use swaps to hedge risk in their ordinary course of business. Congress does not intend to regulate end-users as Major Swap Participants or Swap Dealers just because they use swaps to hedge or manage the commercial risks associated with their business. For example, the Major Swap Participant and Swap Dealer definitions are not intended to include an electric or gas utility that purchases commodities that are used either as a source of fuel to produce electricity or to supply gas to retail customers and that uses swaps to hedge or manage the commercial risks associated with its business. Congress incorporated a de minimis exception to the Swap Dealer definition to ensure that smaller institutions that are responsibly managing their commercial risk are not inadvertently pulled into additional regulation.

Just as Congress has heard the end user community, regulators must carefully take into consideration the impact of regulation and capital and margin on these entities.

It is also imperative that regulators do not assume that all over-the-counter transactions share the same risk profile. While uncleared swaps should be looked at closely, regulators must carefully analyze the risk associated with cleared and uncleared swaps and apply that analysis when setting capital standards for Swap Dealers and Major Swap Participants. As regulators set capital and margin standards on Swap Dealers or Major Swap Participants, they must set the appropriate standards relative to the risks associated with trading. Regulators must carefully consider the potential burdens that Swap Dealers and Major Swap Participants may impose on end user counterparties – especially if those requirements will discourage the use of swaps by end users or harm economic growth. Regulators should seek to impose margins to the extent they are necessary to ensure the safety and soundness of the Swap Dealers and Major Swap Participants.

Congress determined that end users must be empowered in their counterparty relationships, especially relationships with swap dealers. This is why Congress explicitly gave to end users the option to clear swaps contracts, the option to choose their clearinghouse or clearing agency, and the option to segregate margin with an independent 3rd party custodian.

In implementing the derivatives title, Congress encourages the CFTC to clarify through rulemaking that the exclusion from the definition of swap for “any sale of a nonfinancial commodity or security for deferred shipment or delivery, so long as the transaction is intended to be physically settled” is intended to be consistent with the forward contract exclusion that is currently in the Commodity Exchange Act and the CFTC’s established policy and orders on this subject, including situations where commercial parties agree to “book-out” their physical delivery obligations under a forward contract.

Congress recognized that the capital and margin requirements in this bill could have an impact on swaps contracts currently in existence. For this reason, we provided legal certainty to those contracts currently in existence, providing that no contract could be terminated, renegotiated,

modified, amended, or supplemented (unless otherwise specified in the contract) based on the implementation of any requirement in this Act, including requirements on Swap Dealers and Major Swap Participants. It is imperative that we provide certainty to these existing contracts for the sake of our economy and financial system.

Regulators must carefully follow Congressional intent in implementing this bill. While Congress may not have the expertise to set specific standards, we have laid out our criteria and guidelines for implementing reform. It is imperative that these standards are not punitive to the end users, that we encourage the management of commercial risk, and that we build a strong but responsive framework for regulating the derivatives market.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in blue ink that reads "Chris Dodd". The signature is fluid and cursive, with the first name "Chris" and last name "Dodd" clearly legible.

Chairman Christopher Dodd
Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs
United States Senate

A handwritten signature in blue ink that reads "Blanche R. Lincoln". The signature is fluid and cursive, with the first name "Blanche" and last name "Lincoln" clearly legible.

Chairman Blanche Lincoln
Senate Committee on Agriculture, Nutrition, and Forestry
United States Senate